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Design Bearings 
Margaret Macintyre Latta 
'rbc use of the tern] "design" is previllent in educution talk (c.g., see the theme is- 
sue o f  E(lr~ctltio/rnl Rcscnrc/rcr, vol. 32, no. 1 (2003)). Surne of this talk tends ra 
ciist design 11s representations manifested through applied method as ways to 
solve ant1 address educational practices ancl issues (e.g., Constantine & Lock- 
wood, 1909; 1)ick & Carey, 1990; lidelson, 2002; Kelly 81 Lesh, 2000). Within this 
focus on representation an impulse for generality ancl commensurability secms 
to clictatc; either tllc di~til must be seen to correspond to sorne external reality, or 
the sul$ccts must agree (c.g., Ilrown, 1992; Brown & Campione, 1996; Cobb, 
Confrcy, cliSessa, I.chrcr, &k Schauble, 2003; Collins, 1992; IIoadley, 2002). l3e- 
sign can become an act (hat reifies and totalizes what is present, and the fulurc, 
that which is absent, different, possible, ant1 yet-to-be-achieved, disappears. Such 
disregard for the future concerns me ant1 tells me the role of design in eclucation 
is ncglccring its artistic roots antl traditions, potentially under~nining the 
strengtlls that design offers eciucation. Certainly, arts-basecl educatinnnl re- 
searchers (e.g., Ililronc, 1995, 2001a, 200Ib; llarone & Eisner, 1997; Eisner, 1991, 
1997, 1999) hi~vc fore-grounded these strengths, valuing the creation of an alter- 
native reality, seeing ambiguity as productive, utilizing expressive, contextunl- 
izcd, and vernacular language, suggesting and promoting empathy and insigl~ts 
moving "towi~rcl uncovering obscured cl~~cstions'"(Uaronc, 2001a, p. 25). But, 
such thinking seems to be absent from much of the body of work recently co- 
opting the term tlesign and in my opinion risks losing sight of the integral nature 
of design vital within t l ~ c  act of designing. Specifically, the loss of temporality 
ancl interplay through reliance on concepts brought to bear, rather than bearings 
found within the act of designing, will bc examined. 'To do  so, I draw primarily 
on the thinking of llcwcy (1931, 1938) and Hakhtin (1990, 1993) as both graund 
their tl~inking in the actudity of the creating act. The Aristotclinn notion ofrcpc- 
t i t ioi l  as pemeilting the act of designing, evoking an ex11loratory, restless movc- 
ment, is taken up as a means to see antl experience the strengrl~s of designing. 
Ilepetition is not sirnply a methorlological, tl~eoretical, or philosophical notion, 
but: a mol.al one. I suggest that the act ofdesigning demancls what Cayuto (1987) 
calls a n  "ethics oCcIisscmination." The act of designing entails a moral obligation 
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to the filture of our work, to gc~lerativity, to thc possibility thal what is ''wholly 
other" (Caputo, 2000) might remain so, and resist bcing calcifietl into a rcpre- 
sentativc design. 
The Act of Designing 
Tlle act of designing assullles that one must enter as a clesigncr into such acts. 
Attending to the act of designing within the act ol'designing and nc~t  he desigri 
itself, becomes the focus. Co~ltrarily, design can be taken up as a rcyrcscntativc 
form, assuming functionary, imposed roles. The rlangcr of calcifying clcsign 
arises, Iiather, the artistic roots ant1 traditioils of design take up clcsign ils a yroc- 
ess enlerging out  of the act. Design is always being yielcletl. It is the capacity to 
see this yielding lnovelnent that is the strength of desigll and is undcrcsti~natccl. 
Returning to the etylnological origin of design Srom the Latin rlCsig/tclrc mraning 
to rtrark orit, I search lor the bearings upon which yiclcling dcsign clcpcnds, the 
conditions of designing grounded in the designer's capacity to cvncomitiintly see 
and act within the adapting, building, creating process of designing. It is this 
search for bearings that I desire to gain greater access into, in orvlcr to rccognizc, 
foster, and nurture the terms of design i11 others. 
I turn to Uald~tin's (1990, 1993) early tiesthetic cssilys and J)cwcyls (1 934, 
1938) later works to pursue the conditions of design. 'Though each writes from 
their own perspective and context, both Bokhtin iultl L>cwcy ground thinking in 
the creating process itself. Uearings/lived tern~s cmcrgc for me Srom each thinker 
that cultivates "the thinking in situations" (Albers, 1969, y. 35)  which en,~blcs 
seeing. In this way, both Uakhtin and L)cwcy help me to insist that dcsign must 
be understood in ternis of human action. Thus, the act of tlcsigning is tdken 111) 
throughout the paper as the act of knowing; the designing process of undcr- 
starding in relation to action itself. Uakhtin and Dewey provide ;I langl~ilgc dlilt 
articulates the lerlns of design and allows ~ i i c  to envision tlicsc terms witlliti tny 
educational practices. Indeed, this is Dewey's (1904) claim, that this movtrrlicnt 
I ~ U S L  be known before it can be directed (p. 21). 
Searching with Bakhtin 
Bakhtin (1993) en~phasizes the uniqucncss and si~~gularily of creating lirr each 
~CI-SOII.  Froin within the acr or riee~l, participatory tlririkirrg oricrlts inrlivitluals. 
This f o c ~ ~ s  on the act as il is happening ~lliikes it necessary 10 see t11c act not ils a 
given conte~nylated at a distance, but to see horn within, a talting into account of 
the givenness, moment by moment. "And all thcsc molnalts, which makc up tlic 
event in its totality, are present to him (sic) as something given iund as something 
lo be achievcd conjoinlly" (p. 30). The si~nultiir~eous nwilrcllcss of hot11 some- 
thing given and so~nething yet-to-be-achieved is crucial to the intent of 1);ik- 
litin's attempt to describe the world in which the actlactor becomes ilw'lrc ofit- 
self/him/herself; a catching of self in the act. I-Ie is clciir that it is not ilirned at 
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clescribing the world produced by that act. It is through Bakhtin's thinking that I 
realize that the concrete is not simply a step toward something else, but rather, 
conco~nitantly a k~zowirlg of the present ancl how to meaningfully proceed. He 
grounds the creating act in the unique human being, located spatially and tem- 
porally in the pllenomenology of  self/other relations. Uakhtin portrays such en- 
tering into sell'/othcr re1atia1.r~ as occurring through events to be lived out, en- 
actetl, or achicvctl: 
111 which tile monients o f  wlidt-is-giveu, and what-is-to-be-achieved, of 
wllLlt i +  dni1 wll;~t o~lglit t o  he, of being nnd v'llue, are insepurable. All 
tllc.rc a[>str,~ct c,~tegorics ,Ire here constituent ~noments of a certain liv- 
ing, corlcretc, ,111cl p'llpablc (intuitable) once-occurrent whole-an 
event. (p. 32) 
'I'hus thc crciitor lincls hirnll~crsclf in a space between what-is-given and what-is- 
to-be-ilchieverl. Uakhtil~ ( 1990) further describes such a space as the problell~ of 
colrtrrtl, rrrtrtcrinl, and firnu; content Oeing what work is about, material being the 
concrete ubstr'lct milttcr out of which work is constructed, and form being 
the rel~ltionsllips in work between self, content, and materials (pp. 257-325). 
Ilut, the problem of content, material, and form does not require a problem 
strlvcr so much ,is the capacity 13akhtin (1993) terms nestlietic seeirlg. Aesthetic 
sccing is cl~i~riictcrized i\s il releasing or opening of one self to the present; an 
immersion in im~nctliacy. It offers accounts of experienced space, timc, body, 
and humCun rclC1tions as they arc lived. 'Shere is an ebb and flow; a rl~ythmic qual- 
ity to time that is not cletern~incd by external timerables. It requires listeni~~g, re-
sponding, and openness in what is heard and what is said. Such engagcrnenl 
thrives on unfr)rcsccn 17ossibilities. Such a spacc places self clearly in the midst, as 
cat~lyst und struncling hoard. Bakl~tin (1993) explains: "What constitutes this cen- 
ter is the hum,~n beink:: everything in this world acquires significance, meaning, 
and value only in correli~tion with man (sic)-as that which is human" (p. GI). In 
other worcls, the ,~ct  of creating is orientcd through actual experiencing, demand- 
ing interct.rnnection~ hetween self and other. Balthtin (1993) filrther clarifies: 
Cootcnt, after ,111, docs not f'lll into lily head like a rllcteor from another 
world, co~~tinuing to cxist there ils il self-enclosed and impervious frng- 
ment, as something tliat is not woven into the unitary fiibric of my emo- 
tios,~l-volitior~,~l, my living and effective, thinking-expcriel~cing, in the 
c,~p,~cit y o f  a11 csscnti,~l moment in tliiit thinlting-cxpcrie~~cing. (p. 33) 
Content comes to 131' nnticrstond within the act of participation in cvcnts them- 
selves, thus ch,~r,~ctcrizcJ ils unique, livcd, embodied, and contextunl, wholly 
clepcntlent on sclf-involvc~nent. Aesthetic seeing searches for the potential in 
mi~terials to pmvide direction, both shuping iuntl limiting inqui~y. Thc conncc- 
tinns fostcrcd are il catalyst to insights, giving the i11quiry meanil~g ancl life. Tl~us,  
Uakhtin (19C)O) tlcscrihes form ant! nlaterial as: "The form ofcontcnt, but a form 
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which is realized in tlie material-is attached to tlie material, as it were" (p. 303). 
So, for111 is i~nderstood as the expression of activity. And, for111 very much in- 
cludes "its creator within itself' (pp. 315-316). Uakhtin's description of the in- 
ternally active human being as creator entering form through seeing, hearing, 
evaluating, connecting, and selecting-takes life. "Fonn ceases to bc outside us 
as perceived and cognidvely ordered material; it becomes an expression of a 
value-related activity tliat penetrates content and transforn~s it" (p. 305). Thus, 
the process is inseparable from the product. Uaklitin (1993) claims tliis rcquircs 
participants: "Know liow not to detach their perfor~ned ilct from its product, 
but, rather how to relate bot21 of thcln to thc unity and unique context of life arid 
seek tu dcterrniric them in tliat coiltext as iln indivisible unity" (p. 19). 
l3aklitin (1990) suggests a language tliat expresses the flux, the movement 
necessary to grapple in-between self, conlent, material, and form, f~rsing process 
and product into an interdependent, ongoiilg unity. Within tliis iridivisiblc tuiity 
Uaklitin introduces the language of aiis~uerability, o~~tsirlcrzuss, and titrfitimlizobility 
for describing involvement in the creating act. He portrays answerability arising 
out of a fiindamcntal reciprocity between sclf and content, contini~i~lly relating 
to personal understandings and values. 13aklitin cxplains how tliis is not derived 
from a iilechanical relationship of yarts to whole. "Tlie parts o f s~ lch  a wl~olc are 
contiguoits and touch each othcr, but in then~sclves tliey re~nain  illi~11 to cacli 
other" (p.  I). Rather, answerability is dependc~lt on pcrsonal involvcmcnt. Such 
involvement ~lecessitatcs taking "an axiologicill stand in every moment of onc's 
lifc or to  position oneself with respect to values" (pp. 87-88). Uaklitin further 
explai~is that h e  sees tliis living a ~ i d  nioving "110t in a V~CLILIII~,  but in an intense 
axiological atmosphere of responsible, answerable, indeterminatio~i" (p. 275). 
Uaklitin's clai~ii s tliat answerability is not a given, but rather, is seen ils a task 
to engagc in and with, through participation in the crcating proccss. An ctno- 
tional commitlnent and involvement expressing what is pi~rticular and irre- 
placcable in each situated individual conies forth. Througli participation incli- 
viduals question. By delibcrating and doing they becomc answerers; rcsyonsc 
entails responsibility. The subject ~iiatter starts to matter to individuals and 
onc's distinctive~icss from others can become il catalyst to enlarged undcrstanri- 
ings a n d  diverse thinlting. Uaklitin (1986) explains liow outsidc~icss niakcs this 
possibIc. Outsidcness speaks to his interpretation of tlie self as a fully cmbodied 
sell, a self that is constituted interrlependently with the other. Outsidcness is cx- 
p c r i e ~ ~ c c d  tlirougli an intcrdepenclence realized at boundaries wlicrc undcrstantl- 
ings come up against or meet another. Each nccds the other. A sclf-conscionsness 
takes hold that is not ground in a solitary consciousness, but rillher a dcvcloping 
greater consciousness oC otlier, others, and in turn, sclf. Thus, rlcithcr sclf nor 
otlier are bound entities; they intcrminglc in a body-world rclalionsliip yiclding 
an outsideness, belonging as much to tlie other as self. Tlicse new meanings are 
te~ltative, reyrcscnting nloments of clarity but also blurred with unfinished or 
incomplete thoughts. Participants nialte judgments dcrived largely on what sur- 
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faces during process. This is the nature of Uakhtin's (1990) 11otion ofunfinaliza- 
bilty (pp. 121-1321. The interaction of self and other is ongoing and ulti~nately 
unGniili~itble. There is openness to unasked for ancl u~lpredictable learnings. 
CIlange and tfiulsfor~llation are i~lways possible. 
Searching with Dewey 
TIle priniacy of inlelucrion portraycci by Dakhti~l (1993) is integral to Dewey's 
( 1934, 1938) central philosophicul notion ofcxpcricr~cc, Dewey also finds that the 
creative act offers a l i ~ ~ ~ g ~ ~ i l g e  i n d  a way of seeing that atldresses the experience 
from within experience. Ilewcy (1934) speaks of art as a creativc act offering: 
"Living ancl concrete proof that lnan (sic) is capable of restoring conscious1y and 
thus on the place of meaning, the union of sense, need, impulse, and action 
characteristic of the live creature" ( y ,  25). Thus, art cxc~nplifies a living experi- 
ence, a consummation of a movement where a "conclusion is no separate and 
intiependent thing" (p .  38). 'I'licrc is a wl~oleness that n ~ u s t  not be simplified. 
The wllolcncss is tlerived from IJewey's emphasis on an orgarlic sense ofexperi- 
cnce inhcrcnt in the constitution of what it means to be human-embodied 
within ec~cli o f  us. Experience is the life that comprises the organic wbole-the 
human being. 'I"11crc is it vital connection within experience to the past, present, 
and fi~turc. 1)ewcy (1938) portrilys people living both in (ii~rernc~ion) and 
through an environ~ncnt (n~rrtiirrrity) (1). 24). "Different situations succeed one 
anothcr, but because of the principle of continuity sometliing is carried over 
froln the earlier to the later one" (p. 44). The conceptio~ls o f s i tua t io~~  and inter- 
action arc insel~ari~ble. "An experience is always what it is because of a transac- 
tion taking place between an individual and what, at the time, constitutes his 
(sic) environment" (p. 41). The two principles of continuity and intcractio~? in- 
fcrccpt ancl rlriitc (13. 42). Ilewey (1934) emphasizes that experience cornes to be 
"what it is because of tile cnrirc pattern to which it contributes and which it is 
ilbsorbcd" (p. 295). 'I'hus exyerie~~ce involves participants actively structurillg 
what is encountered through active talrlcrgoirlg with an open, vulnerilble, recep- 
tive attitl~dc ancl (loir~g typified as rcspontling, organizing, and discerning. Dewey 
(1934) explains that the interplay betwcc~i undergoing ancl doing is always evolv- 
ing with beginnings and endings occurring throughout, thus: "An experiellce has 
pattern and structure, because it is not just doing and undergoing in alteration, 
but consists of them in relationship" (p. 295). Such interplay seems very similar 
to the relationship Uakhtin conveys living in-between content, material, and 
form; il relationship that both Llewey and Dakhtin identify as requiring seeing. 
Dakhtin's notion of ncsllletic sccirig parallels Dewey's distinction betwee~l recog- 
nition arid seeing. Itecognition is ahout labeling and categorizi~lg, but seeing en- 
tails receptivity, assuming a commitment to finding out about the ensuing inter- 
actions. I)cwcy's talk ofplqposc characterized as an attitude rather than a specific 
or aim darifies the intents of this distinction: "The esserltial point is that. the 
~ > i ~ p o s e  g 1 . o ~  ant1 take shape tllrougb the process of social intelligence" (p. 83). 
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Cortlicclcrirlcss is discussed as the organizational thread thus Dewey claims: "We 
have n o  choice but to operate in accord with the pattern it (experience) provides 
or else to neglect thc place of intellige~ice in the development and control of a 
living a n d  moving experience" (p. 88). Dewey assulncs an active participant 
adapting, building, and changing meaning in an ongoing conversation bclwccn 
self and other very mucll etnbracing Uakhtin's notions of answerability, outsidc- 
ness, and unfinalizability. The implied unity and inovcment are critical to under- 
standing Dewey's (1938) notion of experience as a rriaviiigjurcc. I-Ie clarifies: 
In such experiences, every successive part flows freely, without seam and 
without unfilled blanks, into what ensues. At thc sa111e tinlc there is not 
sacrifice of the self-identity of the parts. , . In an experience, flow is from 
solncthing to something. As one part leads into anothel. and as one pilrt 
carries on  what went before, each gains distinctiveness in itself. The en- 
during whole is diversified by successive phascs that arc emphases of its 
varied colors. (p. 45) 
Inherent Conditions and Consequences of Design 
Uakhtin (1993) and Dewey (1934, 1938) corlvey like conditions found within the 
actuality of 111e crcating act that are worth paying closcr attention to regarding 
the nature of dcsign. Both Uakhtin and Dewey arguc that it is inlpossiblc to scya- 
ratc parts away from the entirety of the act of crcating meaning. It  is experienced 
as connected, all parts linked in relation to the vital move~ncnt of the wholc, be- 
longing to the self and situation concerned in this movement. In this WCIY both 
portray the act of creating meaning positio~li~lg purkicipcltors to be wholly in- 
volved. Bakhtin conveys a space crcated that positions participants in-betwecn 
content, material, and form pervaded by his (1990) notions of answerability, 
outsidencss, and ~~nfinalizability. And as Dcwcy conveys, momentary semblanccs 
of meaning come to be. But such semblances are dynamic; parts arc always 
evolving ant1 uilfoldillg into further semblnnces of meaning. Mcaning is solnc- 
thing always t o  be achieved, striving for unrealized potcntial. And, it is il learning 
space only for "those who wish and know how to think participativcly" (Dakbtin, 
1993, p. 19) expcriencccl as a "kind of nlental activity which characterizes mental 
growth and, hence, the educative process" (Dewey, 1904, p. 22). 
Finding accorclai~ce with the vital movement of the whole entails [inding 
tlircction within the movement, a knowing in aclion irrlirril~tcly and ricccssarily 
related within the lnovelneilt itself (Dewey, 1938, p. 20). Failure to take t l ~ c  tnov- 
i t igji)l~e of expcr ic~~ce illto account betrays experience. Sucfi betrayals ma~lifcst 
themselves through focusing on cnds, ignoring the elements of knowing within 
experience. Dewey (1938) met this betrayal of experience in the misinterprcta- 
tiom of  his thinking often stripping experiencc of its dynamic unfolding and un- 
del.going character. Thus, he wrote of the tzecd of o rlreory of'cxpcrierrcc (p. 25). 
I3akhtin sougl~t  such a theory too, keenly aware that the rational and se~lsuous 
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ilspects of our  being arc in a constant stiite of reciprocity. It seems both Bakhtin 
ilncl Llcwey value temporality and interplay as givens to be worked wit11 and si- 
multaneously working as dynan~ic practices, permeating the act of creating 
~neaning.  Synthesizing my seilrches wit11 Uakhtin and Dewey, I find temporality 
arld illtcrplay to hold the following interdependent consequences for the nature 
o f  design, its orgrunization, form and ensuing relationships, giving expression to 
the bearingsllivecl terms of designing: 
Design-a discourse by nature 
Embodying the very unicluc, personal, humanness of meaning making, Itnowl- 
edge rcsicles in self-experience. 'The act of knowing entails a "reorganizing or re- 
construction of experience" (Llewey, 1934, p. 76), past informing present, with 
ilnplications for the future. This temporal reorganizing/reconstructing process is 
likened l o  a dialogue between sell' and other. The discourse entered into becomes 
the design. The L.atin root of ~liscoursc is disctirstls, a running about. The implied 
sense of movement i111ri the unique experience of this running are integral con- 
siderations, 'T'hus, a pattern of tl-iought acknowledging the interplay of context, 
tirnc, ancl personal experience grows, becoming the necessary link to sense mak- 
ing, suggesting a clesign organization and form. 
Organization-inquiry guided 
'I'hc temporal discourse Ilaklitin (1993) ancl Dewey (1934, 1938) give expression 
to is not  simply interactive, it entails dwelling within context. The relational in- 
terplay must be attended to fro111 within the search for meaning. I am reminded 
of  Maxine Grecne's (1988) "rlialectic oj'jredoni," in which "one's reality rather 
than being fixed and precleGned is a perpetual emergent, becoming increasingly 
~nult iyjcx,  as more  perspcctivcs are taken, Inore texts are opened, more friend- 
ships are macle" (p. 23). 'This crncrgcnt nature characterizes the organization in 
the making, derived frorn the irlcluiry itself. Most importantly, transformation 
occurs with ill1 clnangir~g in the process. This is Gadamer's (1992) understanding 
of  play us clisti~lct from self and other. lllay is its own experience, reuniting 
means and erlds, ~eeliant on the performance (y. 134). It is the performance, the 
13aklitinian clct and  the Deweyan cxl)eriencc that has a spirit of its own which par- 
ticipants Inust attcncI to anti take up. The reciprocal interaction and modifica- 
tion entailed, transforms mcnnings in the making. 
Form-a narrative way of knowing 
T h e  act of creating meaning is socially motivated, socially embedded, and de- 
rived l'~-om the personal narratives of experience. Narrative is a form where the 
interplay o f  time, place, experience, and personal knowledge call be represented 
fully. ?'he relations, connections, and interactions tire parts of the whole. Unity is 
soruething bod1 Uaklltin (1993) and Dewey (1934, 1938) see revealed in the form 
of the action as il whole. Nassativc demands such a search for unity, evolvillg and 
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reforming as k~lowledge is collstructed and generated. Therefore, to talk of the 
actlexperience of creating lneaning talces a narrative form, acknowledging the 
~nultiplicity of knowing and the dialectical rclationshiys involved. 
Inherently and necessarily relational 
Implicit within design, and its organization, and fonn arc ~nultiplc intcrscctillg 
rclations holding the potential to generate the ongoing dcsigning mavenlent of 
thought. Ualthtin (1993) and Dewey (1934, 1938) do not characterizc this move- 
ment i11 any way as arbitrary, and yet uncertainty is integral to the process. The 
differences between arbitrariness and ernbracing ur~cert.ainties are important :\nd 
need to be examined more fully. Neither Uakhtin nor 1)cwcy suggests iI pre- 
determined plan. Arbitrariness denies the existence of relationships with no ac- 
knowledgemel~t of what particularities bring to situations. It is aimless, at the 
mercy of fortuitous evcnts. It does not loolc back or ahead, with no cncl in sight. 
Thus it assumes a carefree, careless abandonment to the monlcnt. Arbitrariness 
is characterized as thoughtless and reckless. Embracing uncertainties is distin- 
guished from arbitrariness through its deliberate nature. This delibcrt~te nalurc 
does not entail a predetermined and fixed purpose, though. 12athcr, dccisions are 
dcrived fro111 within situations demanding receptivity to sensory qualities and re- 
latiorls between self and other on  an ongoing basis. In other words, the irrvcr~tion 
and creation of lncalling is sought. A spirit of inquiry cnlergcs of its ow11 voli- 
tion. This centers on  discovery, with this neither being an objcct or a concept, 
but a deliberate, ongoing search conconlitantly seeking and giving self lo thc crcil- 
tion. Such seeking and giving of self e~nbraccs means and encls. Llcwey (1934) 
talks of the arlist assuming the attitude of the perceiver while involvcd in the 
maki11g process, Only as ends and means arc taken logether, made part of one's 
response, can this form a continuurn. Embracing uncertaintics is necesw~rily prc- 
sent acting as a catalyst. Space for speculation, projection, the unanticipated, 
guides and provides direction. Embracing uncertaintics as strength is the catalyst 
sustaining the movement integral to both Dcwey's and Dalchtin's thinking. And 
as Dewcy (1916) claims, "This is a doctrine of humility; but it is also a iloctrinc 
of direction. For it tells us to open the eyes and cars of the mind, to bc sensitivc 
to all the varied pliases of life and history" (pp. 11-12). So, arbilrariness is not 
present. Embracing uncertairlties through discernment is a better fit as both 
Uewcy and Uakhtin convey a relational designing lnovcmctlt as a discourse by 
nature. The designing ~novelnent is inquiry guided, narra~ivc in for111, and inher- 
ently relational, concomitantly seeing, thinking, doing, and i~cting responsibly. 
Dynamics of Design: Seeing and Repetition 
Designing through discern~nent requires sensitivity to il mcdium as a medium 
(Dewey, 1934, p. 199). IL asks us to attend to "that which appears qualitatively 
and focally at a particular moment" (Dewey, 1926, p. 7), taking an intcrcst in 
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t ha t  which appears. Intcrcstcdness is about being in the middle of tliings-the 
s]>iIce found between sclf anrl other clcrivecl frorii within the act of participation. 
A ~ i d ,  such participation is always extending bind enlarging rlerived from tlie bear- 
ings disclosed within tlie movenient. Uaklltin (1990) characterizes sucli partici- 
pation through his intcrrelatecl notions of nirswcrnbiliry, o~rtsitieness and clllji- 
rlalizahility. Ilewey (1934) cl~aracterizcs such participation through his 
ir~tcrrelatetl notions of ~loirtg and rrrrdergoitzg. Undergirding both charocteriza- 
tions is the notion of rcpcliric~tr, Repetition is n notion that Risser (1997, p. 34) 
traces back ro Arisrotlc (1925). liepetition is disc~isscd as a turn and re-tun1 to 
self understurrding, acting on possibilities. Acknowledging and working witli 
temporality and interplay demands repetition. Risser explains that in "this te111- 
poral tnovclnent of the sclf toward its future possibilities, one recommits oneself 
to the possibilities that arc recognized as one's own" where "past possibilities of 
ac t io l~  become fiiture pessibilities and arc repeatecl in the iiloment of decision" 
(p. 38). 'I'hus, Ilisser conclucles that repetilion is "fundamentally dynamic" (p. 
39). In so doing, he clearly distinguishes dynamic repetition (creative and life 
giving) from static repetition (repeating the same). It is dynamic repetition that 1 
see iis the central task of tledgning. C:rei~ting meaning enrails coming to uncler- 
stand cliffercntly, ilnd thus concomitantly, creating ant1 re-creating sclf. This rc- 
pctitive movement is ii continuous process af conling to see; a backward movc- 
nicnL that recovers anrl re-presents alongside a forwartl movernent that generates 
and cvolccs. I'erliiips, the role and place of repetitive seeing as the source of the 
movement is what hiis been repci~tcclly misintcrpretccl and misunderstood, be- 
trayi~ig tlesign its 11 nloving force. Cars (2000) alludes to this iclentifying techni- 
cist and non-tcchnicist seeing its the crux of "much confusion in eclucetinnal de- 
bate" (p.  70). Seeing taken up in a technicist manner ignores the particularities 
of contcxt and follows proccdurcs to n pre-given end. 'I'hus, technicist secing rc- 
duccs action to prcdcfined bcliavior, substituting Gnitc goals for transforma- 
tional tliiiilcing, and  replacing juclgment with predetcr~nincd rules a11d skills. 
IGlthcr, non-teclinicist seeing considers what is at stake in a situation. This is not 
a generalizable iniposed wisdom but rather spccific to u moment, unanticipated. 
And, most importnntly, furthers the movement of thought in self and others. 
But, tlic repetitive seeing cntailecl in entering iis (1 creator into designing most 
i m p ~ r t i ~ n t l y  positions t l ~ c  reator to see with potential involving il curious inter- 
play between self and crtlier, between creating ant1 being created. I'otcntial refers 
to Gadamer's (1992) insistence that 
Altl~ougl~ it is necessary to see what a situation is iislcing of us, this seeing 
does not mean that we pcrceivc in tlie situation what is visible as such, 
but tllat we le'lrn to see il as t11e situation ofiiction and hence in the light 
o f  what is right. (1'. 322) 
I use "curious" to acknowledge tllc emborliecl particularities of sucli exchanges 
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illat cannot reoccur. Tile interplay discloses ways of  seeing living wilhin the 
movement. It is dynalnic and transforn~iltioni~l undcssta~icling of' ~~cpctitive 
seeillg that is missing, more apt to be undermined, the movement is thwarted. 
This is w]ly Dewey (1938) distinguishes between crlucutivc and mis- 
educative experience (p.  75). And, Balchtin (1993) cdnnot imi~ginc living in a 
world where contellt is imposed: "In that world I ill11 unnece.ssilr.y, I a n  CSSCJI- 
tially and fu~ldamentally non-existe~lt in it" (p. 9 ) .  
TIle lilll< between repetitive seeing and its potential fclr. the L'iiturc is the 
Inoral grounding that takes repetition beyond simply a n~cthodtrlogil.i~l, thcoreti- 
cal, o r  philosoyhical consideration. What gets protluccd is other; I)cyontl what 
might be given, or specified in advance by theory, or  guarutitcccl by method. It 
assumes a concerll wit11 what it is that ought to be cl011~; :I rnotlc ot. W ~ Y  oFbcing 
in the world elltailing p~lrsuit of the good. Anti, s11c.h a scil~ch fat' the gootl is al- 
ways in ilnmediale relationsllip to the wllolc arising from the particulars of situa- 
tion and returning to situation. It is not about gazing out upon iUI cxtcrrt,rl world 
applying meaning but rather meaning in the making dccrnerl littirig to situations 
on an on going basis. Caputo (1987) is l~clpfiil hcrc arguing that the story or 
much methodology, theory, ant1 philosophy has been to "still the llux, to contain 
its course, to asrest its play" (p. 257). Instci~d hc proposes ;In "cthics oC ctissemi- 
nation" awakening us to the play, fostering a "fresh cut into tllc co~nplcxity of 
the situations wc face" (y. 261). Caputo cxpluins thilt iln ctllics of clisscttlination 
"requires the hardiness o l  repetitiol~" . . . to instill motion tlii~t is "Ilcxihlc, in 
flux, reformable, responding forward" (p. 263) .  'Shcrc is both i\ vigilant husl?icisn 
and a concern for attending to the play itself that crln l ~ c  opcri~~ion,llizccl only 
tl~rough a community engaged in an ongoing ciiscoiirsc, Openness to possibility 
is key. There is a nloral obligation to thc fttturc, to gcncriitivity, to tlic possiblc 
that what is "wl~olly other" (Caputo, 2000) might remilin so. 
Conclusion 
Discovery and inventio~l yield design, bringing forth i1 1'1ngible ftrr~n. 'I'hcrc is lit- 
tle room for exploring designing as bcit~g-i~~-~hc-worIcl wh rc rigill rilles dictate 
the way in which design shoulcl bc represenlctl. l-imir,~tions u~ttluly impingc 
upon or restrict the possibilities for clcsigning. 1)csign CIS I~cing-in- he-world 
comes from playing with possibilities, starching for rcl,itiot~ship~. '1"llc tlcvclep- 
ment of such thinlcing in situation ;~llows for tlic discovcry of pc)tcnti,il. It per- 
mits possibilities to be included as the search cvolvcs. Without ,I ~ z l , ~ y  fill .spirit it 
would seem that imaginative thought, rccluiring sl)ccul,~tion ,in11 co~ljcctur.ing 
about possibilities, might not be possible. So as cclucatos.s linll ~hcn~sclvcs ,lugh[ 
up in  the immediacy of given situations, they arc conf'~*onted with citllcr contriv- 
ing encounters to fit a fixed idea or acting o n  ,I openness to new itlctis ~ n c i  an ac- 
ceptance of alternatives through listening a11d rcspontling to the j>,~rticul~rritics of 
contexts. Belief in the worthiness of the latter ,~ppro,lc.ll to ~1esig11 t rC~t l~l ,~ tcs  ill o 
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greater comlni i~nenl  o scilrch for these consideralions in their designing prac- 
tices. 'I'hc act o f  creating mciuning ~nilkes visible the bearings of its own visibility. 
'The beilrings lie in constantly cluestioning what we see and thinlc about the world 
as it opens up. 
+-. I he process becomes i~ searcll for intentionality that articulates a different 
mode of design rooted within its artistic traditions; one that is reflexive, an inter- 
change of interpretations asking all involvecl to contirlualIy revise and enlarge 
underslandings. ?his mat~ifesting chi~rilcter assurnes a mode of design under- 
stood as coming into beillg, rcliilllt on l 1 1 ~  relational complexities coming to- 
gether in particular teaching/leurning situations a r~d  the ongoing conte~nplation 
of these relations. I t  restores the participatory, active nature to design taking life 
as a movenlcrlt of thought. 13akIitin (1990,1993) and Dewey (1934,1938) denote 
<tesign henrings (hilt c nu st he liccdcd, providing images and voc;ibulaly to see 
anew. 'I'hc act of designing sllapes and guides from wilhin meariing making, tak- 
ing its b e a r i ~ ~ g s  from tllc particularities coming togctller, concolnitantly aware of 
circumstunces i1nt1 the potctltial of those circumstances. Such a repetitive move- 
ment seeks out and seizes back possibilities in life. Designing accordillgly entails 
seeing the concrete situatio~l as it is, and as it might be. 
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